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1.

Introduction

Much of the recent debate as to the criteria which determine whether a charge is
properly characterised as fixed or floating has revolved around charges over book
debts or other receivables. Charges over chattels have received somewhat less
attention, even though an attempt to create a fixed charge over chattels gives rise to
interesting questions, some of which do not arise when the collateral consists simply
of receivables. While some of these questions have received judicial attention in
recent years, others are only now starting to be considered. In this paper, we provide
an overview of some of the most important factors which would have to be taken into
account when advice is sought as to whether a charge over chattels is fixed or
floating. The paper also brings to bear upon this issue principles from other parts of
legal doctrine, the relevance of which has not so far been noticed in this context.
Where there is a conflict in the authorities, we present our view as to where lies the
balance of arguments. We also explain the method to be employed when a debenture
is construed in order to determine the proper characterisation of a charge contained in
it, paying particular attention to the relevance of the conduct of the parties subsequent
to its execution. The paper concludes by summarising our discussion in the form of
nine propositions.
In determining whether the provisions contained in a document have created a
floating or a fixed charge security over certain assets, it is necessary to establish the
essential features of the two species of security.
2.

The essential characteristic of a floating charge

The classic description of the characteristics of a floating charge is that of Romer LJ
in Re Yorkshire Woolcombers Association Limited:1
“I certainly do not intend to attempt to give an exact definition of the term
‘floating charge’, nor am I prepared to say that there will not be a floating
charge… which does not contain all the three characteristics that I am about to
mention, but I certainly think that if a charge has the three characteristics that I
am about to mention it is a floating charge. (1.) If it is a charge on a class of
assets of a company present and future; (2.) if that class is one which, in the
ordinary course of the business of the company, would be changing from time
to time; and (3.) if you find that by the charge it is contemplated that, until
some future step is taken by or on behalf of those interested in the charge, the
company may carry on its business in the ordinary way as far as concerns the
particular class of assets I am dealing with.”
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As explained by Lord Millett,2 the first two characteristics referred to by Romer LJ,
while typical of a floating charge, do not necessitate the conclusion that the charge is
a floating one. It is the third characteristic “which is the hallmark of a floating charge
and serves to distinguish it from a fixed charge”. As Vaughn Williams LJ stated in the
Yorkshire Woolcombers case,3
“[W]hat you do require to make a specific security is that the security
whenever it has once come into existence, and been identified or appropriated
as a security, shall never thereafter at the will of the mortgagor cease to be a
security. If at the will of the mortgagor he can dispose of [the asset] and
prevent its being any longer a security, although something else may be
substituted more or less for it, that is not a ‘specific security’.”
This approach has received modern confirmation at the highest level. It was followed
by Millett LJ in Re Cosslett (Contractors) Limited:4
“The essence of a floating charge is that it is a charge, not on any particular
asset, but on a fluctuating body of assets which remain under the management
and control of the chargor, and which the chargor has the right to withdraw
from the security despite the existence of the charge. The essence of a fixed
charge is that the charge is on a particular asset or class of assets which the
chargor cannot deal with free from the charge without the consent of the
chargee. The question is not whether the chargor has complete freedom to
carry on his business as he chooses, but whether the chargee is in control of
the charged assets.”
The same approach was also adopted by the Privy Council in the Brumark case,5
which in turn was followed by the House of Lords in Smith (Administrator of Cosslett
(Contractors) Limited v Bridgend County Borough Council, where Lord Hoffmann
stated:6
“[B]ecause the property subject to [the charge in the Cosslett case]
(constructional plant, temporary works, goods and materials on the site) was a
2
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fluctuating body of assets which could be consumed or… removed from the
site in the ordinary course of the [chargor’s] business, it was a floating
charge”.
It follows that a charge is likely to be construed as one floating over a fluctuating
body of assets which remain under the management and control of the chargor if the
relevant instrument “contemplates that the [debtor] company will from time to time in
the future and in the ordinary course of its business change its plant, machinery,
fixtures, fittings and ancillary equipment”.7
3.

The essential characteristic of a fixed charge

As regards the extent to which the chargor must be ‘free’ to deal with the assets
(without recourse to the chargee) such as to indicate that the security created is
floating charge security as opposed to fixed charge security, where under the terms of
the relevant security the chargor had the freedom (or it is clear that that is what was
intended) to deal and dispose of the assets in the ordinary course of business, the
charge will be construed as a floating charge as opposed to a fixed charge.8 (What
constitutes the ordinary course of business is considered below.) However, the
existence of certain restrictions on dealing with an asset may not necessarily be
inconsistent with a charge being a floating charge.9
Similarly, a certain element of control over particular assets on the part of the chargor
is not necessarily inconsistent with those assets being subject to a fixed charge.10 The
existence of a power vested in the chargor to substitute charged property for the
purposes of maintenance, alteration or improvement does not necessarily imply that
the charge is floating. Authority for this may be found in Holroyd v Marshall11 and
Seed v Bradley.12 However, it is important to note that the chargor’s power to remove
assets from the security is consistent with the security being a fixed charge only if
both of the following conditions are met: (a) the power is limited to the situation
where the assets are to be repaired or improved, and (b) the power is one of
substitution, or in other words, it consists of a power to remove assets from the
7
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security coupled with a duty to acknowledge that the substitutes of those assets fall
within the ambit of the security.13
The second condition in particular is crucial to the nature of the fixed charge. The
holder of a fixed charge gains an immediate property right in the particular asset
subjected to the charge, which is not defeated by the chargor’s unilateral attempt to
dispose of those assets.14 As a result, an asset acquired in substitution for the charged
asset is automatically subject, in the chargor’s hands, to the property right of the
chargee.15 The reasoning of the courts in Holroyd and Seed, in insisting upon the need
for substituted assets to be considered within the ambit of the security, is based on the
recognition of this persistence of the property rights of the fixed charge holder. By
contrast, the holder of a floating charge acquires rights in the fund constituted by the
relevant assets, and not in any particular asset itself, since his rights “hover” or “float”
over the assets until the charge crystallises.16 Since the removal in the ordinary course
of business of assets from that fund releases them altogether from the rights of the
floating charge holder, any assets (or indeed monies) acquired in substitution are not,
qua substitutes, covered by the floating charge.17 It follows that an agreement by the
parties that charged assets may unilaterally be put outside of the security by the
chargor and that assets acquired in substitution for them are not to be considered part
of the security is inconsistent with their having created a fixed charge, and consistent
with their having created a floating charge.
In Re Cimex Tissues Limited,18 the company in question had purported to create a
fixed charge over the machinery it used to produce toilet rolls, and over a forklift
truck specifically modified for use in its business. The badly drafted debenture19
appeared to give the company the power to sell, mortgage or otherwise deal with the
charged property in the ordinary course of business. The question was whether the
charge created was fixed or floating. The court held the charge to be fixed.
In reading the learned judge’s decision, it is important to bear in mind the following
points. First, the debenture appeared to be internally inconsistent, so that the court had
to decide which of its parts reflected the true intentions of the parties. Second, on its
proper construction, the debenture did not confer on the company power to deal with20
or sell21 any part of the charged property without the chargee’s consent. However, the
judge concluded that even if the company had had a unilateral power to dispose of the
charged property, he would have been minded to hold the charge to be fixed rather
13
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than floating.22 All aspects of the judgment dealing with whether the charge could be
fixed even though the company had been given the power to remove assets from the
ambit of the charge without the chargee’s consent therefore constitute obiter dicta.
Third, in reaching this decision, the judge was influenced by his reluctance to allow
the “unequivocal words of [the relevant clause] explicitly referring to a fixed charge,
[to] be overridden by what is in the present debenture a highly ambiguous and
uncertain provision for sale…”23
Finally and significantly, the learned judge purported to follow Holroyd v Marshall
and Seed v Bradley. However and as already noted, the reasoning of the courts in
these cases turned on the chargor’s unilateral power being restricted (a) to the
circumstances where the charged assets needed to be repaired, maintained or
improved, and (b) by an explicit acknowledgement that the substitute assets would
fall within the ambit of the charge. Neither of these requirements was in fact satisfied
by the debenture before the court. The judge considered this difference to be relevant
only as “to the commercial sense of the transaction from the point of view of the
chargee, rather than the legal classification of the charge created.”24 For the reasons
explained above, however, it is respectfully submitted that this proposition must be
open to considerable doubt. This, coupled with the fact that the discussion concerning
the nature of the charge where the chargor has the unilateral power to dispose of the
collateral constituted obiter dicta, suggests that the judgment does not constitute even
a persuasive authority for the proposition that such a charge may nevertheless be
properly characterised as a fixed rather than a floating charge.
4.

The purpose and quality of the chargee’s control

The purpose for which control is exercised over the collateral, the capacity in which
the person exercising control does so, and whether he may do so consistently with his
other legal obligations, all are crucial factors in determining whether the charge is a
fixed one. Let us take these in turn.
In In re Cosslett (Contractors) Limited,25 the chargee Council claimed that it had a
fixed charge over a coal washing plant by virtue of the fact (among others) that the
plant could not be removed from the site without the permission of an engineer, who
would make the decision on the basis of whether or not the plant was required for the
completion of the works on site. This claim was rejected. It was material to the Court
of Appeal’s decision26 to regard the charge over the coal washing plant as floating that
this “restriction [did not] have any relation to the council’s security. The council’s
purpose in imposing the restriction was not to protect its security but to ensure that the
company would give proper priority to the completion of the works.”27
In Re Double S Printers Limited,28a company had granted a debenture to one of its
own directors containing what purported to be a fixed charge over present and future
22
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book debts and a floating charge over the rest of its property. Before Jonathan Parker
J, the director argued that “the necessary element of control ha[d] at all material times
been present de facto in that, as director of the company and one of the two
signatories under the company’s bank mandate, [the director] at all material times
exercised actual control over the book debts”.29 The court rejected this argument:30
“In order for the debenture to take effect as a fixed charge over present and
future book debts, there must, it seems to me, be some right of control over the
debts, or their proceeds, exercisable by [the director] in his capacity as
chargee, and not in some other capacity, e.g. as a director of the company.
The opportunity for [the director] to exercise de facto control of the
company’s bank account in his capacity as a director of the company is, in my
view, nihil ad rem… In any event, as a director, [he] was at all material times
under a fiduciary duty to the company to act bona fide in the interests of the
company, and not for a collateral purpose such as the maintenance of his rights
as chargee.”
5.

The relevance of the nature of the charged assets

The nature of the assets sought to be charged is also relevant to the issue of how ‘free’
the chargor is to deal with those assets, and therefore, to whether the security to which
those assets are said to be subject is fixed or floating charge security.31 For example, a
charge expressed to be a fixed charge over stock in trade or raw materials is normally
construed by the courts as being a floating charge. Since the assets in question
constitute a highly fluctuating body of assets which will, by necessity, be used, in the
sense of being disposed of or consumed, in the ordinary course of the chargor’s
business, the implication is that the chargor has the ability to deal with the relevant
assets in the ordinary course of its business without recourse to the chargee. The
courts here are doing no more than recognising the commercial reality of the position:
to hold that essentially circulating assets of this sort are subject to a fixed charge
would be to require that they could not be used in the chargor’s business in the normal
way without the chargee’s consent, which would result in the paralysis of the former.
Importantly, however, the converse is not true. A charge may be a floating one even
though it is over assets which do not form part of the circulating capital of the debtor
company. In Re ASRS Establishment Limited (in administrative receivership and
liquidation),32 the question concerned the status of a purported fixed charge over
money held in an escrow account. In confirming Park J’s decision at first instance that
the charge was floating, Walker LJ on behalf of the Court of Appeal said that “[t]he
fact that this particular item was not a regular or reliable source of working capital
seems to me irrelevant.”33 In Cosslett itself, the charge was held to be floating even
though it was over (among other things) the coal washing plant which constituted a
central part of the chargor’s fixed capital structure.34
29
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In ascertaining what, if any, significance is to be accorded to the nature of the assets,
helpful guidance is provided by the recent judgment of Etherton J in Ashborder BV v
Green Gas Power Limited.35 His Lordship indicated36 that in construing whether the
chargee has sufficient control over the charged assets for the charge to be considered
as fixed, the court will first look at the ordinary and natural meaning of the words in
the debenture in order to ascertain whether the chargor has been given a unilateral
power to dispose of the assets in the ordinary course of its business. If it has, then the
charge is floating, not fixed. It is only if, upon its true construction, the debenture is
silent as to whether the chargor has this power that the court will turn to examine the
charged assets in order to determine whether or not they fall into a category of assets
which could sensibly only have been subjected to a floating charge.
6.

The ambit of the ordinary course of business

In Ashborder, Etherton J had to consider whether certain transactions were within the
ordinary course of the debtor company’s business so as to fall within its power
unilaterally to deal with assets subject to the floating charge. His Lordship
summarised his examination of English and Commonwealth authorities on the issue
thus:37
“I do not propose to attempt any particular formulation of the test for
determining whether a transaction falls within the ordinary course of a
company's business for the purpose of a floating charge, or to make any
comprehensive statement of the criteria for determining when a transaction is
to be held to have taken place in the ordinary course of business for that
purpose. On the other hand, it may be helpful to summarise briefly the
following conclusions that I have reached from the decided cases that I have
reviewed: (1) The question whether a particular transaction is within the
ordinary course of a company's business in the context of a floating charge is a
mixed question of fact and law; (2) it is convenient to approach the matter in a
two stage process; (3) first, to ascertain, as a matter of fact, whether an
objective observer, with knowledge of the company, its memorandum of
association and its business, would view the transaction as having taken place
in the ordinary course of its business, and, if so (4) second, to consider
whether, on the proper interpretation of the document creating the floating
charge, applying standard techniques of interpretation, the parties nonetheless
did not intend that the transaction should be regarded as being in the ordinary
course of the company's business for the purpose of the charge; (5) subject to
any such special considerations resulting from the proper interpretation of the
charge document, there is no reason why an unprecedented or exceptional
transaction cannot, in appropriate circumstances, be regarded as in the
ordinary course of the company's business; (6) subject to any such special
considerations, the mere fact that a transaction would, in a liquidation, be
liable to be avoided as a fraudulent or otherwise wrongful preference of one
35
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creditor over others, does not, of itself, necessarily preclude the transaction
from being in the ordinary course of the company's business; (7) nor does the
mere fact that a transaction was made in breach of fiduciary duty by one or
more directors of the company; (8) such matters in (6) and (7) may, however,
where appropriate and [sic] in all the circumstances, be among the factors
leading to the conclusion that the transaction was not in the ordinary course of
the company's business; (9) transactions which are intended to bring to an end,
or have the effect of bringing to an end, the company's business are not
transactions in the ordinary course of its business.”
Of particular relevance is his Lordship’s treatment of the question whether disposals
of assets covered by the charge to raise money towards the continuation of the
chargor’s business could be regarded as being in the ordinary course:38
“The proper starting point is that the words in the expression ‘ordinary course
of its… business’ are ordinary words of the English language which must be
given the meaning which ordinary business people in the position of [the
parties to the relevant debentures] would be expected to give them against the
factual and commercial background in which those documents were made…
[S]uch businessmen would not be likely to take so narrow a view of ‘ordinary
course of business’ that it would not embrace a transaction for the preservation
and continuance of a company’s business, merely because it was not a
transaction that had ever been carried out before… As Mahoney JA
observed[39], Borax[40] is, indeed, English Court of Appeal authority that a
transaction may be in the ordinary course of business even if it is exceptional
or unprecedented.”
It is submitted that the quoted passages have important implications for answering the
question whether a charge is fixed or floating. A contention that the nature of the
assets charged is such that they would not in the ordinary course of business be
disposed of by the debtor company is to be tested as follows. At the first stage, it
would have to be ascertained whether “an objective observer with knowledge of the
company, its memorandum of association, and its business” might take the view that
those assets might be dealt with in the ordinary course of the debtor’s business. It
would be open to this observer to conclude that it would be in the ordinary course of
business of a financially distressed company to raise money in order to continue its
business, for example, either (a) when it has several units of the same type of asset, by
selling off some units, which sales, while cutting down the debtor company’s
productive capacity, would allow it to continue operating, or (b) to arrange for a sale
and leaseback of some of the charged property. The second stage would involve an
examination of the debenture containing the charge which was to be characterised.
The process of settling upon its true construction would give require giving due
weight to the finding at the first stage as to whether the collateral consists of such
assets as were capable of being disposed of in the ordinary course of the chargor’s
business.
7.

Identifying the charged property

38
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It is essential that the instrument creating a fixed charge identifies the charged
property with sufficient specificity. This is important for two reasons. First, the
creation of a fixed charge grants an immediate property right in the specific assets
charged to the chargee. This carving out and transferring away of property rights from
the chargor’s title to those assets can only take place if the assets have been identified
clearly enough for the instrument to act upon the chargor’s title.41 Secondly, the
existence of a fixed charge requires the chargee to exercise effective control over the
charged assets, and in particular, requires it to monitor certain types of dealings with
them by the chargor.42 Such monitoring cannot take place, and thus, the requisite
control cannot be exercised, unless (at the very least) the parties are aware of the
identity of assets the chargor’s ability to deal with which has been made conditional
upon the chargee’s consent having been sought and given.43
For both these reasons, it follows that where a debenture purports to create a fixed
charge over a broadly defined category of assets, it will succeed in doing so only to
the extent that the parties identify with sufficient precision, for example through a
schedule or register, the particular assets that are to form the subject matter of the
grant.44
8.

‘All or nothing’

If a clause in a debenture purports to create a fixed charge over assets some of which
clearly could not have been intended to be subjected to such a charge, then the entire
clause is likely to be interpreted as having created a floating charge. In Re G E
Tunbridge Limited,45 a debenture purported to create (among other things) a fixed
charge over “[a]ll other assets (not being Floating Assets) now owned or hereafter
acquired by the Chargor or in which it now has or in the future acquires an interest”
(“the para 2 assets”). Many of these assets (“the auction chattels”) had been auctioned
by the time that the matter came before the court. In deciding that the charge in fact
created was floating and not fixed, Sir Mervyn Davies said:46
“I bear in mind that the para 2 assets include not only such assets as the
chattels that were sold by auction but also intangible assets such as book
debts…I cannot see that the debenture was apt to create a specific charge over
the company’s book debts… [W]hen one looks at the range of chattels
itemised in the auction particulars it is, in my view, unrealistic to suppose that
41

See e.g. Re Goldcorp Exchange Limited (in receivership) [1995] 1 AC 74, per Lord Mustill
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individual contract relied upon.” See also Illingworth v Houldsworth [1904] AC 355, per Lord
Macnaghten at 358: “A specific charge… is one that without more fastens on ascertained and definite
property or property capable of being ascertained and defined.”
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a considerable number of the auction chattels would not or might not be
changed or removed from time to time… My conclusion is that the document
as a whole discloses a situation in which a floating charge arises over the para
2 assets…”
In Re ASRS Establishment Limited (in administrative receivership and liquidation),47
the Court of Appeal was faced with construing the effect of (among other things) the
following clause (“clause 2.1(v)”):
“[ASRS]… charges by way of fixed charge all book debts, bank account credit
balances and other debts and claims now or at any time during the continuance
of this security due or owing to [ASRS]…”
At first instance, Park J had held that the:48
“… critical point is that the subparagraph cannot be read so as to create a fixed
charge over some of the ‘other debts and claims’ but a floating charge over
others of the ‘other debts and claims’. It is all or nothing. Either it creates a
fixed charge over all the other debts and claims, or it creates a fixed charge
over none of them. I believe that analysis is correct as a matter of construction
of the debenture. It is also consistent with the decision of Sir Mervyn Davies
in Re G E Tunbridge Limited…”
In the leading judgment in the Court of Appeal, Robert Walker LJ did not consider it
necessary to decide the issue. However, his Lordship stated that while he was unable
to accept the ‘all or nothing’ view without reservation, this view is likely to prevail in
practice when debentures are construed, “even if it is not requisite as a matter of legal
analysis.”49
The ‘all or nothing’ view is also consistent with Lord Hoffmann’s approach in Smith
(Administrator of Cosslett (Contractors) Limited) v Bridgend County Borough
Council.50 The House of Lords here had to decide (among other things) whether a
clause created a fixed or a floating charge over a coal washing plant.51 It was argued
before their Lordships that while the clause “might create a floating charge over
materials and small items of plant which were more obviously likely to come and go
during the course of a four-year contract, it should be construed as a fixed charge over
the washing plant, which was unlikely to be removed and received a separate mention
in [a different provision in the debenture.]”52 Lord Hoffmann rejected this argument
on the basis that it was “impossible to construe [the clause] as creating a charge over
the washing plant different in nature from that which it created over the other plant
and materials brought on site.”53
47

[2000] 2 BCLC 631.
[2000] 1 BCLC 727, 737a-c.
49
[2000] 2 BCLC 631, at [29-[31].
50
[2001] UKHL 58; [2002] 1 AC 336. The Court of Appeal’s decision in In re ASRS Establishment
Limited was cited to their Lordships.
51
The clause may be found at [2002] 1 AC 336, 345-346 at [10].
52
[2002] 1 AC 336, 353 at [44].
53
Ibid., at 353 at [44]. See also Re Armagh Shoes Limited [1984] BCLC 405, per Hutton J at 419,
where his Lordship said, “It was not seriously argued that the charge could be fixed in respect of some
48

10

9.

The parties’ objective and subjective intentions

So much for the substance of the distinction between fixed and floating charges. The
process of ascertaining the legal nature of a charge begins with the construction of the
debenture.54 Construction is a matter of mixed fact and law.55 It may be approached in
two stages which, in this context, were first formalised by Millett LJ in Orion Finance
Limited v Crown Financial Management Limited, 56 and authoritatively restated by the
Privy Council, speaking through Lord Millett, in Brumark.57 The first stage, which we
call ascertainment, is concerned with questions of fact, and consists of the
construction of the debenture with a view to ascertaining the objective intentions of
the parties.58 The aim at this stage is not to discover whether the parties subjectively
intended to create a fixed or a floating charge. The point, instead, is to identify what
rights the parties intended to bestow on each other and by what obligations they
intended to be bound (for example, whether the chargor would be required to seek the
chargee’s consent before engaging in certain types of dealings with the charged
assets). The label attached to the charge by the parties provides some, though not
particularly probative, evidence as to their intentions. The second stage, which we call
categorisation, is concerned with questions of law and operates independently of the
parties’ intentions. It consists of an analysis of their rights and obligations under the
relevant document, as it has been interpreted at the first stage, in order to determine
whether the charge created is fixed or floating. Since it is the document as a whole
which governs this question, it follows that if, upon its true construction, “the effect of
the document as a whole is inconsistent with the terminology which the parties have
used, then their ill-chosen language must yield to the substance.”59
10.

Post-contractual conduct

In Brumark, in commenting upon the importance of the chargee’s control over the
collateral, Lord Millett stated that a requirement that the chargor pays over the
proceeds of certain book debts into a blocked account with the charge holder would
constitute sufficient control for the charge over those books debts to be characterised
as fixed. Lord Millett then went on to say this on behalf of the Privy Council:

of the assets and a floating charge in respect of the remainder of the assets and I consider that there is
no basis for such an argument.”
54
On contractual interpretation generally, see Investors’ Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich
Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 .
55
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the words and secondly their legal effect, or the effect to be given to them. The meaning of the words I
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effect of the words used is a question of law”, per Lindley LJ in Chatenay v Brazilian Submarine
Telegraph Company Limited [1891] 1 QB 79, 85.
56
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Green Gas Power Limited [2004] EWHC 1517 at [163] et seq.; see in particular at [181] and [183].
58
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“their Lordships would wish to make it clear that it is not enough to provide in
the debenture that the account is a blocked account if it is not operated as one
in fact.”60
This dictum, suggesting that enquiries might have to be made not just into the terms
of the debenture but also into the way that the account would in fact have been
operated, raises interesting questions. It is a well established principle that, in general,
any conduct of the parties (whether by words or actions) occurring after entry into an
agreement is inadmissible as an aid to construction of that agreement.61 It follows
that, in general, the conduct of the parties after the execution of the debenture is
irrelevant as to the issue whether it creates a fixed or a floating charge. This has been
frequently confirmed.62 So what is the significance of post-contractual conduct? This
Section investigates what Lord Millett might have had in mind when he uttered the
dictum noted above.63
We suggest that post-contractual conduct can only be relevant to the proper
characterisation of a charge in one of five situations. The first two arise where the
debenture is alleged to be a sham or a mere pretence, respectively, and in either case,
the post-contractual conduct of the parties would be examined in order to ascertain the
rights and obligations that they had in fact intended to create.64 A sham consists of
“acts done or documents executed by the parties… which are intended by them to
give to third parties or to the court the appearance of creating between the parties
legal rights and obligations different from the actual legal rights and obligations (if
any) which the parties intend to create.”65 What is crucial here is that “all the parties
thereto must have a common intention that the acts or documents are not to create the
legal rights and obligations which they give the appearance of creating."66 A mere
pretence is also an act done or document executed that does not represent the true
nature of the agreement. There is, however, no requirement here that the parties be
colluding in order to disguise this nature. It is sufficient that one of the parties intends
to do so, with the other merely concurring in the purported terms of the agreement
because it does not properly understand them, or because it is driven by circumstances
to assent to those terms.67 This distinction will be important, for example, where it is
the company itself which, wishing unilaterally to dispose of the charged assets,
challenges the charge-holder’s claim that the charge is a fixed one. An argument on
its behalf that the agreement is a sham might be met with the response that it cannot
plead its own illegality in asking the court to depart from the explicit terms of the
60
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debenture.68 Such a problem would not arise where the chargor can rely on the claim
(which in most circumstances would be more appropriate on the facts anyway) that
the relevant provisions of the debenture were a pretence, the company’s need for
funding having rendered it helpless to resist whatever terms might have been imposed
upon it by the proposed creditor.
The third situation concerns the claim that the terms of the debenture in question have
been varied by the conduct of the parties after its execution, the fourth arises where it
is alleged that the benefit of certain of the terms in the debenture has been waived by
the appropriate party, and the fifth concerns the situation where one party has become
estopped from asserting a certain right. What distinguishes the first two situations
where post-agreement conduct is relevant from the remaining three is that, in the
former, the conduct of the parties is relevant because it provides evidence as to the
intentions of the parties as at the time of entry into the agreement, whereas in the
latter, the conduct is examined, insofar as relevant, to throw light on the parties’
intentions at the time when they engaged in the relevant conduct.
While variation on the one hand and waiver and estoppel on the other are often treated
as identical, the Court of Appeal has recently pointed out that they must be carefully
distinguished, since (a) variation by conduct alters the obligations to be performed
under the terms of the agreement, whereas waiver and estoppel merely affect the
remedies available to the party for the breach of those terms; and (b) variation
requires the presence of offer, acceptance and certainty of terms, the usual elements of
contract formation, whereas waiver and estoppel do not.69
Consider the effect of variation first. Suppose that the debenture on its terms does not
allow the chargor the right to engage in unilateral dealings with the collateral, but
subsequent to the execution of the debenture, the chargor has openly dealt with the
charged assets without the chargee’s consent and the latter has continued its lending
facilities without raising any objections. If the conditions for an effective variation are
satisfied, then the charge, which might properly be characterised as fixed according to
the terms of the debenture,70 would now fall to be classified as floating. What is more,
it is arguable that since this variation by conduct has brought a new (floating) charge
into existence, this charge might have to be duly registered.71 Failure to register
would, on this view, render it void as against the liquidator, administrator or any
creditor of the chargor. Note also that, after the variation, if the chargor in the normal
course of its business grants property rights in the charged assets to a third party, the
latter is unencumbered by the chargee’s rights.
The difference in this context between a waiver of the right to veto the removal of an
asset from the ambit of the charge, and being estopped from doing so, lies in whether
the right to veto is lost permanently, or whether a particular breach of that right is
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accepted (‘waived’) by the chargee. The former is a case of estoppel,72 while the latter
is a case of election waiver. Taking estoppel first, suppose that the chargor forms the
assumption that it can dispose of some or all of the charged assets without seeking
consent from the chargee, and that the chargee has either encouraged this assumption,
or knowing about it, has acquiesced in it. This might happen, for example, if the
chargor disposes of some part of the collateral openly but without the chargee’s
consent, and the chargee, through words, actions or omissions, represents to the
chargor that it will not seek a remedy either for this violation of the chargee’s veto
rights over disposal or for similar events in the future, unless it is accompanied or
preceded by some other event (‘the specified event’) (say, the chargor failing to make
a loan repayment at the appropriate time). If the chargor significantly alters its
position in reliance on this representation, the chargee is henceforth estopped from
asserting its right to veto disposals of the collateral by the chargor in the absence of
the occurrence of the specified event. Put differently, it has released altogether its
right to demand compliance with the provisions in the debenture requiring its consent
before the chargor may dispose of the collateral.73
The consequences are far-reaching. The chargee has effectively deprived itself of the
ability, unless the specified event takes place, to assert the right to control disposals of
the charged assets by the chargor, or in other words, to assert the very right which
distinguishes a fixed from a floating charge. It must follow, at the point at which this
right is lost through estoppel, that the fixed charge ceases to exist, and a floating
charge takes its place, which will crystallise at the occurrence of the specified event
and at the breach of any of the terms implied into the debenture. Consider the
alternative, that the charge remains fixed even though the chargee no longer controls
disposals in the normal course of its business by the chargor of the charged assets.
This seems clearly inconsistent with the principle in Brumark that the chargee can
only claim the benefit of a fixed charge if it in fact exercises such control.74 A chargee
cannot circumvent this requirement simply by placing itself in a position where it
becomes estopped from being able to exercise a monitoring role over the collateral,
and thus being required to do so. It also follows therefore that those acquiring rights
over the charged assets prior to crystallisation would do so free of the chargee’s
rights. The floating charge which comes into existence at the point at which the
chargee’s right to veto disposals of the charged assets is lost by estoppel may also, if
appropriate, need to be registered.75
Finally, consider waiver:76 “the basic proposition is that where two possible remedies
or courses of action are open to X [the party which has suffered a breach of a term of
72
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its contract by its counterparty Y] and [X] has communicated his intention to follow
one course or remedy in such a manner as to lead Y to believe that his choice has been
made, he will not later be permitted to resile from that position”.77 Note that while
silence alone does not constitute waiver, it might do so when viewed in its
commercial context, or when it is combined with other contractually significant acts
or omissions.78 Where property rights in the charged asset are disposed of by the
chargor without the chargee’s consent, the chargee has a choice (an election) as to
whether to resort to the remedies available to it, for example by withholding credit,
demanding repayment or appointing a receiver or administrator. Faced with these
alternatives, the chargee, explicitly or by continuing to provide credit to the chargor,
might be taken to have waived its right to pursue any of these remedies. Since its
justification lies in promoting certainty and finality in contractual dealings, the waiver
becomes effective immediately, without any need for the chargor to rely on it.79
There are two important differences between this type of waiver and estoppel. First,
waiver operates only in respect of an individual breach, and the chargee does not lose
the ability to insist henceforth on strict compliance with its right to veto disposals of
the collateral by the chargor. Of course if the evidence demonstrates a pattern of
unilateral dealings with the collateral on part of the chargor followed by ‘waivers’ of
the sort just mentioned, then the proper conclusion might be that the provision
requiring the chargee’s consent is a sham or a mere pretence, or that the proper
interpretation of the parties’ dealings is that the chargee has lost its ability to assert
this right by variation or estoppel.80 Second, a waiver of this sort does not deprive the
chargee of all of its rights with respect to the breach, but only those against which it
has elected. It is important to notice, therefore, that the chargee might still be able to
assert that the person granted property rights in the collateral (‘the transferee’) as a
result of the breach takes subject to the chargee’s rights.81 Should the chargee be
successful in asserting rights against the transferee, the latter may then have a claim
against the chargor, for example, for total failure of consideration or breach of
contract. In this case and depending upon the correct interpretation of the terms upon
which the waiver took place, the chargor might have a claim against the chargee for
acting inconsistently with the waiver, or in other words, for approbating and
reprobating.82
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11.

Conclusion

The above discussion may be summarised in the following nine propositions:
(1) The characterisation of a charge depends on the proper construction of the
instrument creating it. It is the relevant intentions of the parties as encapsulated in the
debenture or other instrument creating the charge that matter. The label attached to the
charge is just one, fairly weak, bit of evidence as to these intentions. Any intentions
alleged to be operating extraneously of the debenture are, in general, irrelevant to
proper characterisation.
(2) In general, the conduct of the parties subsequent to the creation of the charge is
irrelevant to its true characterisation. However, it may be relevant to determining
whether the debenture, taken on its terms, is a sham or a mere pretence, or whether
the parties by their conduct have altered the terms of their agreement as enshrined in
the debenture, or waived or become estopped from asserting certain of their rights.
(3) The essential characteristic of a floating charge is the chargor’s right to put assets
beyond the ambit of the charge without the chargee’s consent.
(4) The essential characteristic of a fixed charge is the existence of sufficient legal
constraints on the chargor’s ability to put assets beyond the ambit of the charge
without the chargee’s consent. Looking at it from the latter’s viewpoint, the charge is
fixed only if the chargee has sufficient control over the charged assets.
(5) The chargee’s control can only be sufficient if it is (a) for the purpose of
safeguarding the chargee’s security and not merely for some other purpose, (b) not
inconsistent with the chargor’s legal obligations, and (c) exercised by the chargee in
its capacity as chargee, and not in some other capacity.
(6) In construing whether the chargee has sufficient control over the charged assets,
the nature of the assets subjected to the charge may be taken into account if the
debenture is silent about whether the chargor may unilaterally deal with the assets.
The more probable it is that the chargor’s business would be paralysed if it were
prevented from being able to alienate the charged property in the normal course of
business without the chargee’s consent, the more probable it is that the parties have
created a floating charge, not a fixed one, other things being equal.
(7) In general, the alienation of assets in order to raise finance falls within the normal
course of business.
(8) In ascertaining whether the chargee has sufficient control of the charged assets for
the charge to be fixed security, the debenture must identify the charged property with
sufficient specificity.
(9) If a clause in the debenture purports to create a fixed charge over several
categories of asset, some of which clearly could not have been intended to be made
subject to a fixed charge, then the entire clause is likely to be interpreted as creating a
floating charge.
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